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Abstract
We examine state GDP comovement and consumption risk-sharing channels within
the United States as a whole, and among states whose populations have voted con-
sistently Democrat (Blue) or Republican (Red) in national elections. We document
three facts: (1) state GDP growth is asynchronous, and Blue and Red states are
particularly out of sync; (2) at the same time, interstate consumption risk-sharing is
very high–it is high even across the political divide, and it is high even where the role
of fiscal flows is minimal; and (3) the channels of risk sharing across Blue, Red, and
Swing states are quite different.
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1 Introduction
As Europe moved deliberately, if uneasily, towards deepening monetary and eco-
nomic union in the nineteen nineties, the U.S. economy provided a benchmark for
envisaging Europe’s future. The U.S. experience illustrated how idiosyncratic risks
within a union could be smoothed despite having only a single, economy-wide mone-
tary policy. Now, after European monetary and economic union has progressed, ris-
ing political tensions in Europe and elsewhere have reignited disagreements about the
costs of monetary and economic union. Concerns over migration and fiscal transfers,
along with regionally clashing political preferences–as evinced by Britain’s ‘Brexit’
vote, the U.S. 2016 Presidential election, Germany’s 2017 federal elections and the
Italian 2018 election for example–raise questions about how macroeconomic risks
are now shared. Do the political divisions themselves stand in the way of economic
integration? Do they prevent risk sharing? Is the United States still an example
of successful integration despite its own political divisions? This paper specifically
addresses the last question, but we believe our findings have implications for the first
two as well.
To evaluate the relevance of the United States as a modern benchmark for mon-
etary union, we quantify states’ GDP divergence, risk sharing, and sharing channels
over the most recent decades. We use newly available, comprehensive data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on personal consumption expenditures by
state. The new data resolve previous concerns about the use of retail sales data to
measure consumption, and they allow us to quantify the role of other smoothing
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channels not yet explored year-by-year within the United States. So, in addition to
examining fiscal and financial channels, we account for smoothing via interstate mi-
gration,1 via real exchange rate changes,2,3 and via the purchases of durable goods.
At each stage, we construct political regions based on states’ stable voting patterns
to quantify the differences across the political regions.4 To be clear, our goal here is
not the identification of the effect of political differences on economic differences (or
vice versa). Instead, our goal is to examine whether macroeconomic divergence and
risk sharing channels–including federal-state tax and transfer flows–mirror the coun-
try’s most obvious political divide, and to determine whether and how risk sharing
survives in its presence.
We document that states’ GDPs diverge markedly, and the GDPs of the Blue
(consistently Democratic) and Red (consistently Republican) regions diverge even
more: in terms of GDP comovement, the Blue and Red regions look like two sovereign
1
? augmented their work by using census data to try to explore the role of migration; however,
because the data were only available by decade, they were precluded at the time from exploring its
role in smoothing consumption over business cycle frequencies.
2In the United States, allowing for smoothing via real exchange rates is the same as allowing
for smoothing via prices: the real exchange rate is simply the relative price level adjusted for the
nominal exchange rate, and the single currency precludes nominal exchange rate fluctuations; so,
here–as in the Euro Area–a relative price change equals a real exchange rate change.
3To implement the price channel, we use state price indices constructed from underlying raw
price data obtained from the ?. The ? has published the Cost of Living Index quarterly since 1968.
Various authors, including ?, and ? have studied the data underlying the Cost of Living Index.
Notably, the Council’s price data include only consumer prices, rather than the broader set of goods
represented in states’ GDPs. Using these data to deflate state GDPs allows us to explore the role
of prices, but the limitation of having only consumer prices means the estimates necessarily entail
measurement error; we discuss the implications of this measurement error in section 4, where we
present the related empirical results.
4While political divisions reflect many characteristics, such as age, gender, race, and metropolitan
conditions, it is states that have the most complete consumption data, that map comprehensively
into Congressional representation and federal tax and transfer flows, and that correspond most
naturally to the country boundaries of other monetary unions (such as the Euro Area).
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countries. At the same time, output divergence within the United States provides
an opportunity for smoothing consumption: consumption risk is shared both across
states and between the Blue and Red regions–though the mixture of channels used
for risk-sharing differs substantially across the color regions. We also find that the
additional risk-sharing channels that we explore are significant ones for the country
adfs a whole: together, they cut unshared idiosyncratic risk in half.
Overall, our findings indicate that–despite its own internal political and economic
divisions, including differences in how risk sharing is achieved–the United States
still provides a benchmark of economic integration. The stark political differences
between the Blue and Red regions show up just as starkly as economic differences, but
their differences do not stand in the way of risk sharing, which occurs largely through
capital and credit markets rather than fiscal flows. While we examine the United
States, the single case demonstrates that GDP asynchronicity and even substantial
political divisions are not by themselves impediments to a successful monetary union
even where fiscal flows are small.5
Our work proceeds in three steps. We begin with a simple assessment of the extent
of inter-state synchronicity within the United States in section 2. Then, in section
3, we use the newly available consumption data to look at income and consumption
together to examine the extent of consumption smoothing. Finally, in section 4, we
examine how consumption risk is shared across the states; this is where key regional
differences come to light.
5Europe remains of particular interest. ? compare the political differences within the United
States to those within Europe (or at least the EU 15 countries) and–perhaps surprisingly–find
substantial similarities.
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2 GDP Synchronicity
This section assesses the extent to which the GDPs of the states move together
within the United States.6 We begin by looking at all of the states, then we look
separately at regions that we define based on voting patterns.
Here, we characterize GDP synchronicity using the negative of the absolute dif-
ference in states’ GDP growth rates. While there are many possible approaches to
characterizing synchronicity, this method is straightforward, and it is feasible even
when the length of the time series is modest.7 Specifically, we adapt the approach
of ?, who examine GDP synchronicity across countries, to comparably define syn-
chronicity among states as follows:
ψi,j,t = −|(lnYi,t − lnYi,t−1)− (lnYj,t − lnYj,t−1)|, (2.1)
where Yi,t and Yj,t are the GDPs of the i
th and jth states in year t. The measure
becomes more negative when GDPs between two states are less synchronised.
Figure 1 shows in black the average in each year of this U.S. state-by-state mea-
sure of synchronicity from 1993 through 2015.8 State-by-state synchronicity declined
substantially in the mid-2000s until the great recession, when the state economies
slowed together, then began briefly to recover together. Most recently, the state
6GDP comovement is among the classic criteria used to evaluate the optimality a currency or
monetary union, but it is not a necessary condition for optimality.
7While many studies in this literature, such as the early work of ?, measure synchronicity
using correlations, ? point out that the divergence measure used here is robust to various filtering
methods, and it is unaffected by the volatility of output. The importance of the latter is emphasised
by ?. ?, in turn, follow ?.
8Data and their sources are described in the appendix.
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economies have again markedly diverged.
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Figure 1: State GDP synchronicity
Over the period as a whole, the average divergence in bilateral GDP growth
rates is about 2.5 percent. This number can be put into perspective by comparing
it with synchronization measures for international economies. ? report an average
divergence in bilateral real GDP growth rates of about 1.75 percent for 20 rich
economies in the three decades before the 2008 downturn.9 By this measure, the
state economies within the United States are more asynchronous than comparable
international economies. That is, figure 1 shows us that the current ability of the
United States to cohere as a monetary union cannot be attributed to synchronized
9Developing economies are less synchronised; see ?.
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business cycles among the states.10
We can correspondingly measure the synchronicity between the output in the
region made up of the states whose residents consistently vote Democratic (Blue) in
presidential elections and the output in the region made up of states whose residents
consistently vote Republican (Red) in presidential elections. As discussed above, the
political designation does not indicate an underlying characteristic that is indepen-
dent of economic conditions. The political differences between Blue and Red states
arise endogenously and represent many elements. While we focus on some of the
macroeconomic outcomes that differ between the Blue and Red states, numerous
authors have explored industry, household and individual level differences, includ-
ing differences in demographics, family structure, education, and health.11 Here, we
designate a state as Blue if a majority of its voters chose a Democratic presidential
candidate in every election between 1987 and 2015; and we designate it as Red if
the majority of its voters chose a Republican presidential candidate in every election
during the period. We designate all other states as Swing states.
The synchronicity measure is then:
Syncblue,red,t = −|(lnYblue,t − lnYblue,t−1)− (lnYred,t − lnYred,t−1)|, (2.2)
where Yblue,t is t-period output in the ‘region’ made up of Blue states, and Yred,t is
the t-period output in the ‘region’ made up of Red states. This measure is shown by
the green line in figure 1. Until the mid-2000s, the economic activity in two groups
10We discuss in the next section why this lack of synchronization does not imply a lack of inte-
gration.
11See, for example, ? and ?.
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of states were about as synchronised with each other as were the states within the
country as a whole. However, the two diverged somewhat more markedly from each
other in the run up to the crisis of 2008, and they only briefly returned to the degree
of synchronicity exhibited by the country as a whole before diverging yet again.12
Other differences between the Blue states and the Red states become apparent
when we examine the synchronicity within each of the two groups. Letting b equal
the number of Blue states, and r equal the number of Red states, the average syn-
chronicity within each color region is given by:
Syncblue,t = −
2
b(b− 1)
|(lnYi,t − lnYi,t−1)− (lnYj,t − lnYj,t−1)|, ∀i, j ∈ Blue (2.3)
Syncred,t = −
2
r(r − 1)
|(lnYi,t − lnYi,t−1)− (lnYj,t − lnYj,t−1)|, ∀i, j ∈ Red. (2.3’)
These measures are shown in Figure 2: the blue line gives the synchronicity
among Blue states, and the red line gives the synchronicity among the Red states.
The economies of the Blue states move together more than do the economies of the
Red states. The difference between the two color regions is most evident recently:
economic activity among Blue states has converged, while it has diverged among
Red states. Over the period as a whole, the average divergence in bilateral GDP
growth rates among the consistently Blue states is about 1.9 percent; and the average
divergence among the consistently Red states, at about 3.3 percent, is much more
12A Chow test for a structural break half-way through the sample (significant at the one-percent
level) helps to confirm the visual impression that economic growth in the Blue and Red states is
more divergent now than in the past.
7
-.0
6
-.0
5
-.0
4
-.0
3
-.0
2
-.0
1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Sync blue Sync red
Figure 2: GDP synchronicity among Blue states and among Red states
pronounced.13
Overall, the synchronicity measures given in this section indicate that–in terms
of economic activity–the state economies of the United States diverge greatly. For
the country as a whole, the economies of the individual states are as varied as if they
were distinct countries.14 This is particularly true of the Red states. Moreover, for
Red states, the divergence has been greatest over the last decade. Whether within
the color regions, across the color regions, or for the country as a whole, economic
activity across the states varies greatly. In the next section, we explore whether
13The difference, 1.4 percent with a standard error is 0.2 percent, is statistically significant at all
standard confidence levels.
14Note that the synchronicity or asynchronicity of states, like that of countries, reflects size,
industrial make up, and a host of other characteristics that (appropriately) are not are not controlled
for. To condition on such attributes in measuring synchronicity would be to abstract from the very
differences that determine countries’ or states’ suitability for sharing the same monetary policy.
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the pronounced divergence in economic activity is carried over to consumption, or if
instead consumption risk is shared across the states.
3 Consumption Smoothing
The divergence of economic activity across states, regions, and countries in prin-
ciple can provide an opportunity for integrated areas to share risk in order to smooth
their consumption.15 That is, consumers in integrated economies can benefit from
output divergence. In the simplest case of two economies with exogenously given
production, individuals in each of the two economies can share risk by holding assets
that pay out in the other economy’s production. Their consumption would then be
related even when their production is not.16 With consumption risk spread between
the two economies, neither economy’s consumption would be tied lock step to its own
production, and divergent economic activity would allow both economies to smooth
consumption. Moreover, in the spirit of ?, ? shows that integration itself can induce
specialization, which in turn would lead to output divergence.17
In this section, we look at consumption and income together to assess the extent
of state-level consumption smoothing within the United States. Using consumption
data not available at the time of the previous studies of U.S. consumption smoothing,
we find that a great deal of consumption risk indeed is shared within the United
15There is a large literature exploring the many facets of the theoretical relationship between
economic integration and GDP synchronicity. Both ? and ? provide overviews of the theoretical
ambiguities in the context of related empirical work.
16For example, with iso-elastic utility and complete asset markets, the consumption growth rates
in the two economies would be completely equalised.
17
? and ? document empirically that specialization and risk sharing are linked both regionally
and internationally; ?, in turn, corroborate this finding in a careful examination of regional risk
sharing and specialization within the EU 15 member states, and they themselves invite studies of
the risk sharing channels.
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States. This contrasts with the international evidence. That is, while economic
activity is as asynchronous across the states as it is internationally, consumption
smoothing tells a different story: consumption risk is shared within the United States,
even across the Blue and Red regions, much more than it is internationally. (How
that sharing is accomplished is the subject of section 4.)
This section’s examination of consumption and income follows ?, ?, ?, ?, and
others who examine the diversification of consumption risk internationally. Specifi-
cally, we regress idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic income growth.
Where consumption risk is shared, the estimated coefficient on idiosyncratic income
should be low.
To measure consumption for each state, we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis’
new data on personal consumption expenditures, which is now the Bureau’s most
comprehensive measure of household consumption. The Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis released its first prototype of these data in 2014, but the series begins in 1997;
this makes it possible to include a substantial period both before and after the global
crisis. Earlier key studies relied on retail sales data to gauge consumption. While the
retail sales data go further back in time, the new personal consumption expenditures
data provide a more comprehensive measure of the purchases by residents of each
state (including such things as travel expenditures, housing and financial services,
and the net expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving households). Furthermore,
it does not conflate those purchases with purchases made by nonresidents. These
new data also allow us to separately examine the use of durable goods purchases as
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a mechanism for smoothing consumption.18 For comparability with earlier work, we
focus on total personal consumption in this section; however, in the next section,
where we study the various channels of smoothing, we separate out durable goods
purchases, which themselves can be thought of as a saving vehicle that can be used
to smooth consumption.
We begin by examining consumption risk sharing within the United States as a
whole. Let ci,t equal the growth rate of consumption in the i
th state in year t. We
regress each state’s idiosyncratic rate of consumption growth on its idiosyncratic rate
of GDP growth in a panel, as follows:
ci,t − ct = βu.s.(yi,t − yt) + vi,t. (3.1)
In each period, the average consumption, ct, and the average output growth, yt, is
each defined over all of the United States.
The first column of table 1 gives the results of this regression. As shown, the
estimated coefficient on idiosyncratic output growth is 0.22. That is, just over one-
fifth of a state’s idiosyncratic output growth shows up in a corresponding change in
its consumption. This implies a much higher degree of risk sharing than is reported
in international studies. For example, with more than a century of data for risk
sharing among rich countries, ? report values of consumption risk sharing that
imply coefficient estimates ranging from about 0.40 to about 0.85.19 The much lower
18Without available consumption data, ? pioneered the use in this context of state retail sales
data, which they scaled up by the ratio of aggregate personal consumption to U.S. retail sales.
Their use of retail sales was followed by ?, ?, and many others.
19
? construct ‘consumption risk sharing values’ by multiplying their regression estimates by
100, then subtracting the product from 100. They report consumption risk sharing values of 15
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Table 1: Consumption Smoothing
ci,t − ct (1) (2)
yi,t − yt 0.2234
(-0.0119)
dblue,i(yi,t − yt) 0.2131
(0.060)
dred,i(yi,t − yt) 0.2307
(0.048)
dswing,i(yi,t − yt) 0.2413
(0.074)
Observations 900 900
R2 0.299 0.301
Notes: This table provides estimates of Equations 3.1
and 3.2 using annual data from 1997 through 2015; ro-
bust standard errors are clustered at the state level and
reported in parentheses.
coefficient estimate we find for the United States is well below even the nadir of their
international values. For the country as a whole, consumption risk sharing among
the states is much greater than is international consumption risk sharing.
We also measure the extent of consumption risk sharing for the states defined
above as Red, Blue, and Swing.20 Specifically, we estimate the following regression
using the same panel data:
to 60, which imply the coefficient estimates of about 0.40 to 0.85 mentioned above. In terms of
their measures, our estimate of about 0.22 implies a consumption risk sharing value of 78, which
exceeds even the peak of their reported international risk sharing. Risk sharing among emerging
and low-income economies tends to be even lower.
20Note that here we still subtract the country’s consumption and the country’s income from each
states’ consumption and income. Thus, we measure how much the states in each region share with
the country as a whole, not how much they share among themselves.
12
ci,t − ct =
∑
j=blue,
red,
swing
βjdj,i(yi,t − yt) + ui,t, (3.2)
where dj,i are indicator variables for states whose residents have voted consistently
Democratic (j = blue) or consistently Republican (j = red) in presidential elections,
or whose residents have not voted consistently for one party or the other (j = swing).
What is measured here is the average risk sharing of each color region.
The results of this estimation are shown in the second column of table 1. While
the point estimates themselves might indicate that consumption in the Blue states
is slightly less tied to idiosyncratic state GDP growth than is the consumption in
Red states or in Swing states, the differences are not statistically significant at any
conventional significance level. The estimates for each of the three state groupings are
all roughly on par with the estimate for the country as a whole. All of the coefficient
estimates indicate that there is much more consumption risk sharing among the
states than across international borders.
The estimates provided in this section show that consumption risk sharing within
the United States is substantial. The wide divergence in economic activity across
states enables residents to share income volatility risk and correspondingly smooth
their consumption regardless of political differences. In the next section, we explore
how that is accomplished.
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4 Risk Sharing Channels
This section examines the key channels for sharing consumption risk. That is,
while the previous section documented that consumption risk is shared within the
United States, this section empirically examines the mechanisms through which it
is shared. We estimate the extent to which idiosyncratic consumption is smoothed
via financial markets and via fiscal transfers, and we expand the usual list of U.S.
channels to include changes in population, durable goods consumption, and states’
prices (real exchange rates).21
As before, we first examine the country as a whole, then we look separately at
Blue, Red, and Swing states. Allowing for the additional channels, we are able to
observe more risk sharing than has previously been reported for the United States as
a whole, and we find important differences between the Blue, Red, and Swing states.
We begin with the now-standard identity of ?:
Yi,t =
Yi,t
Y˜i,t
Y˜i,t
Y di,t
Y di,t
Ci,t
Ci,t. (4.1)
As above, Yi,t is defined as the i
th state’s GDP. Y˜i,t is defined as the i
th state’s income,
which includes net payments of dividend, interest and rent across state borders. Y di,t
is defined as the ith state’s disposable income, which accounts for taxes and transfers
(including social security), and Federal grants to states; and Ci,t is the i
th state’s
consumption.
21In related work outside the United States, ? and ? use detailed Italian survey data, which
now include data on the consumption of durables, to carefully quantify household consumption
smoothing in Italy; and ? examine prices as a smoothing mechanism within the United Kingdom
using a slightly different approach.
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As pointed out by ?, risk sharing via the capital market diminishes the corre-
lation between Y˜i,t and Yi,t. Likewise, risk sharing via Federal transfers diminishes
the correlation between Y di,t and Yi,t. Risk that remains unshared shows up in the
correlation that remains between Ci,t and Yi,t. Thus, their identity provides a way
of assessing the empirical importance of these consumption smoothing channels.
To the smoothing channels they originally explored, we incorporate three more
channels directly into the framework.22 First, we allow for smoothing through the
purchases of consumer durables, which can be thought of as a nonfinancial form of
saving.23 Our inclusion of consumer durables follows ?, who use Italian household
survey data around the time of the global crisis. Second, we examine the impact
of year-by-year migration. ? used decade-long population changes to explore the
possibility of longer-run smoothing via migration. Now, annual population data
are available, so we are able to measure the effect of migration year-by-year and
in concert with the other channels. Finally, we add a price channel, which, for
the United States, is the same as a real exchange rate channel since the “nominal
exchange rate” is fixed across all states.24 These additions yield a new identity,
22Work by ? and others suggests that one might also wish to examine smoothing via what
would be state ‘current accounts.’ We do not add the current account as a channel here for two
reasons: first, only limited state-level data are available; and, second, in the absence of state-level
official reserve transactions, state-level currents accounts are in principle mirrored in the capital
transactions captured by the original channels of ?, described above.
23Presumably, consumers care about the consumption of both nondurable goods and the flow of
services from nondurable goods.This formulation implicitly assumes that the flow of services from
nondurable goods occurs smoothly over time.
24The real exchange rate equals the product of the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of the
price levels. So, the change in the real exchange rate, given a constant nominal exchange rate, equals
the change in the ratio of the price levels. In the implementation below, equation (4.5) implicitly
defines the price change for each state relative to the country as a whole, since the aggregate price
change is captured by νP,t. Thus, the relative price changes discussed below are equivalent to real
exchange rate changes.
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one that separates price changes from real variables and includes the migration and
nondurables channels:
Yi,t = Pi,tLi,t
Yr,i,t
Y˜r,i,t
Y˜r,i,t
Y dr,i,t
Y dr,i,t
Cr,i,t
Cr,i,t
Cnd,r,i,t
Cnd,r,i,t. (4.2)
Here, Pi,t is the i
th state’s price level,25 and Li,t is its population; the subscripts
r indicate real per capita values; CD,r,i,t represents real per capita durable goods
consumption; and Cnd,r,i,t represents real per capita consumption of nondurable goods
and services, which is the difference between real total consumption and real durable
goods consumption: Cnd,r,i,t = Cr,i,t−CD,r,i,t.
26 Taking logs and first differences, this
becomes:
yi,t = pi,t+ li,t+(yr,i,t− y˜r,i,t)+ (y˜r,i,t− y
d
r,i,t)+ (y
d
r,i,t− cr,i,t)+ (cr,i,t− cnd,r,i,t)+ cnd,r,i,t,
(4.3)
where pi,t and li,t are the log changes in state prices and population, and yr,i,t, y˜r,i,t,
ydr,i,t, cr,i,t, cnd,r,i,t are the log changes in state per capita GDP, income, disposable
income, consumption, and nondurable consumption.
To gauge the relative role of each potential smoothing channel under considera-
tion, one can multiply equation (4.3) by yi,t and take the expected value; when scaled
by the variance of yi,t, this gives a simple sum:
25As indicated in the introduction, while the data used to measure Pi,t comes from consumer
prices, we use it here to deflate state GDPs; this introduces a measurement error, and we discuss
its implications below when we present the empirical estimates.
26Below, we estimate the extent to which idiosyncratic population changes account for consump-
tion smoothing at the annual level. The change in a state’s population equals migration plus births
less deaths. We discuss the smoothing as occurring through migration; however, it is in principle
possible that the smoothing we measure also occurs in some small part through reactions in births
and deaths.
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1 = βP + βL + βK + βF + βS + βCd + βU , (4.4)
where each term is equivalent to a single coefficient in a univariate regression.27
Imposing the adding up constraint of equation 4.4 implies a SUR panel regression:
pi,t = νP,t + βPyi,t + ηP,i,t
li,t = νL,t + βLyi,t + ηL,i,t
yr,i,t − y˜r,i,t = νK,t + βKyi,t + ηK,i,t
y˜r,i,t − y
d
r,i,t = νF,t + βFyi,t + ηF,i,t
ydr,i,t − cr,i,t = νS,t + βSyi,t + ηS,i,t
cr,i,t − cnd,c,i,t = νD,t + βDyi,t + ηD,i,t
cnd,c,i,t = νU,t + βUyi,t + ηU,i,t.
(4.5)
Here ν·,t are time fixed effects that capture factors that are common across states in
each period, making the estimates analogous to the idiosyncratic measures used in
sections 2 and 4. We write this more compactly as:
yi,t = νt + βyi,t + ηi,t, (4.6)
where yi,t = [pi,t, li,t, (yr,i,t−y˜r,i,t), (y˜r,i,t−y
d
r,i,t), (y
d
r,i,t−cr,i,t), (cr,i,t−cnd,r,i,t), (cnd,r,i,t)]
′;
νt = (νP,t, νL,t, νK,t, νF,t, νS,t, νCd,t, νU,t)
′; β = (βP , βL, βK , βF , βS, βCd , βU)
′, and η =
27Specifically, βP =
cov(pi,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
, βL =
cov(li,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
, βK =
cov(yr,i,t−y˜r,i,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
, βF =
cov(y˜r,i,t−y
d
r,i,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
, βS =
cov(ydr,i,t−cr,i,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
, βCd =
cov(cr,i,t−cnd,c,i,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
, βCnd =
cov(cnd,c,i,t,yi,t)
var(yi,t)
.
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(ηP,i,t, ηL,i,t, ηK,i,t, ηF,i,t, ηS,i,t, ηCD,i,t, ηCnd,i,t)
′.
The panel estimates of equation 4.6 measure the role of each smoothing channel
and are given in table 2.
4.1 All States
The first column of table 2 gives the channel estimates for a panel that includes
all states. Consistent with earlier studies, the largest share of smoothing occurs in
the capital market, given in the first pair of rows. Capital markets now smooth about
43 percent of states’ idiosyncratic risk. Despite the many changes in capital markets
in the United States in the last three decades, this U.S.-wide estimate is roughly on
par with that of ?, who find that about 39 percent of states’ idiosyncratic risk is
shared in U.S. capital markets as a whole.28
The next pair of rows gives the estimate for the extent of smoothing that occurs
through taxes and transfers. About 16 percent of idiosyncratic output is smoothed
through such fiscal flows.29 Again–despite the political changes in the intervening
period–this estimate (for the United States as a whole) is close to that of ?, who find
that about 13 percent of states’ idiosyncratic risk is shared this way.30 It is also not
far from the range of estimates provided in ?, who gives a summary of earlier studies,
though it is somewhat lower than the more recent estimate of roughly 25 percent
reported in ?. Notably, the role of U.S.-wide fiscal flows remains higher than the four
28
? find a slightly higher fraction, about 50 percent, for Germany since the nineties, but ? reports
lower numbers for most of the Euro Area.
29Since we are interested in the ability of states to share risks across state lines, we follow the
literature and report how much fiscal flows offset states’ idiosyncratic risks. Fiscal flows typically
offset somewhat more of the nation-wide, overall fluctuations in GDP.
30In terms of statistical significance, we cannot reject at any reasonable confidence level the
hypothesis that the fiscal flow channel amounts to the 13 percent given in ?.
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Table 2: Channels of Consumption Smoothing
U.S. Blue Red Swing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital: βK , δjβK 0.4288 0.4489 0.3764 0.4980
(0.0236) (0.0517) (0.0424) (0.0460)
Fiscal: βF , δjβF 0.1579 0.1703 0.2627 0.0604
(0.0320) (0.0710) (0.0600) (0.0548)
Saving: βS , δjβS 0.1699 0.1333 0.1329 0.1569
(0.0179) (0.0400) (0.0329) (0.0330)
Durables: βCd , δjβCd 0.0207 0.0392 0.0115 0.0339
(0.0032) (0.0073) (0.0047) (0.0062)
Prices: βP , δjβP 0.0283 0.0583 0.0250 0.0178
(0.0118) (0.0401) (0.0131) (0.0164)
Migration: βL, δjβL 0.0783 0.0921 0.0393 0.1532
(0.0094) (0.0144) (0.0132) (0.0229)
Unshared: βU , δjβU 0.1161 0.0579 0.1521 0.0799
(0.0076) (0.0459) (0.0190) (0.0267)
Observations 900 234 324 342
Notes: This table provides estimates of Equations 4.6 and 4.7 using annual data from 1997 through 2015;
robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses.
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to six percent reported in ? for European countries by the European Commission
just prior to the Financial Crisis.31
The role of credit or saving, as conventionally measured, is given in the next
pair of rows. For the country as a whole, credit smooths an estimated 17 percent of
states’ idiosyncratic risk. While this is somewhat lower than the 23 percent originally
reported by ?, it somewhat higher than the more recent U.S. estimate of 12 percent
reported in ? and ?. It is also remarkably close to European estimates of about 15
percent, reported by the European Commission in ?.
The next three pairs of rows provide estimates for the added channels: durable
goods, prices, and migration. Another benefit of the newly available state-by-state
consumption data is that we are able to estimate the extent to which durable goods
purchases are used as a saving device to further smooth consumption. For the United
States as a whole, durable goods smooth about two percent of states’ idiosyncratic
risk. While this is small compared with estimates for the traditional credit channel,
it is very tightly estimated, and combined with the conventional credit measure it
brings the estimate of the role of savings up to 19 percent.32
The role of changes in states’ prices is given in the next pair of rows. While the
states share a single currency (so there is no scope for smoothing through nominal
exchange rates), their prices nevertheless adjust enough relative to one another to
have some risk sharing impact. Specifically, the estimate indicates that changes
in relative prices smooth about three percent (statistically significant at the five
31It is also higher than the roughly ten percent reported for inter-provincial fiscal smoothing
within China; see ?.
32It is also larger than the extent of smoothing via durables that appears to be suggested by ?
for Italian households.
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percent level) of states’ idiosyncratic risk. Note that the available state-level price
data include only consumer prices, rather than a wider set of prices, and the use
of the narrow set of prices to deflate states’ GDPs introduces a labor measurement
error that likely biases downward the value of our estimate. Hence, the estimates
given in table 2 might more appropriately be considered lower bounds on the fraction
smoothed by prices. Having said that, we observe that our estimate is in keeping
with that found across regions within the United Kingdom by ?, who use a slightly
different, though related, approach.
Substantially more consumption smoothing occurs through migration. As shown
in the next pair of rows, migration smooths almost eight percent of states’ idiosyn-
cratic income growth. One might have expected an even larger value since the United
States is often regarded as having a highly mobile labor force that is very responsive
to labor conditions; and intra-U.S. migration remains high relative to intra-Europe
migration.33 However, ? show that the U.S. migration response to relative economic
conditions–while still high by international standards–has roughly halved since the
1990s, the start of the sample period in our study.
Together, the three additional channels–durable goods purchases, changes in rela-
tive prices, and migration–reduce the unshared idiosyncratic risk by more than half.
They account for roughly 13 percent more consumption smoothing, which leaves
states with only about 12 percent of their idiosyncratic risk unshared.
33While our migration findings are closely related to those of ? and to ?, who compare U.S.
and European labor sensitivity to economic conditions, our work differs from theirs by estimating
migration’s role in smoothing consumption.
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4.2 Color Regions
Next, we examine the channels within each color region. That is, we reestimate
equation 4.6 for states whose residents vote consistently Democratic, for states whose
residents vote consistently Republican, and for the remaining states. Adapting equa-
tion 4.6 using the same indicators of color region used in section 3, dj,i, where j = red,
blue, and swing, we have:
yi,t =
∑
j=blue,
red,
swing
νj,t +
∑
j=blue,
red,
swing
βjdj,iyi,t + ηi,t. (4.7)
The results are shown in columns 2 through 4 of table 2.
For the Blue states, shown in column 2, the standard channels–capital markets,
fiscal flows, and saving–show only minor changes. However, smoothing through
durables is notably higher. While still relatively small, the use of durable goods as
a saving device to smooth consumption–at almost four percent–is roughly double
the estimate for the country as a whole. The point estimates for the roles of prices
and migration are also substantially higher than for the country as a whole, however
the estimates are noisy, so we cannot conclude that prices and migration are more
responsive to economic conditions in Blue states than in the country as a whole.
The estimates for the Red states are given in column 3. Here, the differences are
more marked. Most importantly, in comparison with estimates from the country as
a whole, Red states benefit much more from fiscal flows, yet they are nevertheless
left with substantially more residual risk. As shown in the second pair of rows, fiscal
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flows insulate more than a quarter of the idiosyncratic risk faced by Red states. This
compares with only 16 percent for the country as a whole. As shown in the last rows
of estimates, Red states are left with unshared idiosyncratic risk of about 17 percent,
which is significantly higher than the 12 percent faced by the country as a whole.
The use of durable goods as a saving device to smooth consumption in Red states
is about a quarter what it is for Blue states, and the use of migration in Red states
is about one-third of what it is in Blue states. Residual, unshared risk is highest for
the Red states, and of all of the channels of smoothing, only fiscal flows is larger in
Red states than in the rest of the country.
The estimates for the Swing states, those that do not consistently vote Blue or
Red, are given in column 4. Like the Red states, the biggest difference occurs in
the fiscal flows. Perhaps surprisingly–and in contrast to both Blue and Red states–
Swing states benefit very little if at all from risk sharing through fiscal flows. The
point estimate of six percent is roughly on par with the EU estimates, and it has a
standard error of five percent, which (at any conventional significance levels) renders
it indistinguishable from zero.
If one viewed U.S. Swing states as ‘up for grabs,’ one might have expected Federal
expenditures to be aggressively used to mitigate their economic vicissitudes. That
is, one might have expected the role of fiscal flows to be high, not indistinguishable
from zero. However, it is possible that the potential for fiscal smoothing in Swing
states may be inhibited by their weak Congressional influence. ? document that
Congressional committee chairs consistently direct federal funds flowing through their
committees to their own states; and, we find that Swing states held relatively few
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chairs on important committees in the U.S. House and Senate during our sample
period.34
The Swing states largely accomplish their smoothing through factor markets.
Overwhelmingly the largest portion of their smoothing, almost 50 percent, through
capital markets, while another 16 percent is through credit markets; and another
15 percent is through migration. This role for migration in smoothing idiosyncratic
risk is considerably larger than it is in either Blue or Red states. Finally, while
durables remain only a minor channel for smoothing, Swing states do smooth more
than average using durables.
Overall, the differences in the channels of smoothing used by the three regions
are substantial. In terms of fiscal smoothing, Blue states might be thought of as
being comparable to Canada, while Red states might be thought of as comparable
to countries where fiscal flows are more important in this regard, such as within
the United Kingdom or within Germany.35 Swing states, in contrast, do not appear
to systematically benefit from fiscal smoothing at all. Despite the extent of their
fiscal smoothing, Red states are left with substantial unshared idiosyncratic risk.
In contrast, Blue states use a breadth of channels to smooth virtually all of their
idiosyncratic consumption risk, and Swing states smooth a great deal of their risk
through factor mobility.
34Key Congressional committee chairs are traditionally awarded based on seniority, so the lower
number of Swing state chairs may reflect higher Swing state turnover: we combine the data of
? with the influential committee designations of ? to calculate the number of key Congressional
committee chairs held by states in each color region: Over the sample period, Blue states held an
average of 3.2 important chairs and Red states held 3.6, while Swing states held only 2.3 important
chairs.
35See the summary of international work provided by ?.
24
5 Conclusion
This paper takes a fresh look at the United States as a currency-union benchmark.
Along with newly available data and important changes in capital and labor mar-
kets, the passage of time has brought profound changes in political circumstances.
Here, we examine GDP synchronicity and the scope and the channels for sharing
idiosyncratic consumption risk across the politically divided regions of the United
States.
We find that U.S. political divisions are mirrored in economic divisions, but that
the country nevertheless continues to smooth consumption risk across the politi-
cal divide. Specifically, the economies of the politically divided regions are more
asynchronous than is typical of even separate countries, but the regions share con-
sumption risk more than separate countries do. We also find that their risk-sharing
channels differ markedly: their reliance on fiscal smoothing and on migration dif-
fers, as does the extent of their remaining, unshared idiosyncratic risk. Notably, Red
states benefit the most from fiscal smoothing, yet they also end up with the most
residual risk; while Swing states rely the most on migration and benefit little, if at
all, from fiscal smoothing; and Blue states have the least remaining risk.
The United States has stood out in the past as an exemplar of mobility of many
types within its borders. Now, it stands among the notable exemplars of regional
political division. Our findings show that such political divisions are attended by
macroeconomic differences, but the divisions do not prevent the regions from risk
sharing. The evidence suggests that, by themselves, political and economic differ-
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ences do not necessarily prevent successful participation in a monetary union.
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A Data Sources
Much of the data used in this study comes from the Regional Economic Accounts
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and is available online at https://www.
bea.gov/regional, with methods described at https://www.bea.gov/regional/
methods.cfm. The BEA provides: state GDP, state personal income, and state
population. We use annual data from 1993-2015 in section 2, and since the BEA’s
introduction of state-level personal consumption expenditures data begins in 1997,
we use 1997-2015 for the analysis of consumption smoothing in sections 3 and 4. An
informative description of personal consumption expenditure data and methodology
is provided by ?. For state level prices, we construct state-level consumer inflation us-
ing individual goods and services price data provided by the Council for Community
and Economic Research, and using the fixed-weight methodology of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Additional details are described in ?. Finally, election results were
compiled from data provided by the office of the Federal Register, https://www.
archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/map/historic.html.
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